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» Auction algorithms for market equilibrium
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ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
Abstract. We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-...
Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin
SIAMDM
2010
101views more  SIAMDM 2010»
14 years 4 months ago
Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Solvability of Eisenberg--Gale Markets with Two Agents
Inspired by the convex program of Eisenberg and Gale which captures Fisher markets with linear utilities, Jain and Vazirani [STOC, 2007] introduced the class of EisenbergGale (EG)...
Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vijay V....
KDD
2005
ACM
125views Data Mining» more  KDD 2005»
15 years 3 months ago
Price prediction and insurance for online auctions
Online auctions are generating a new class of fine-grained data about online transactions. This data lends itself to a variety of applications and services that can be provided to...
Rayid Ghani
WWW
2009
ACM
15 years 10 months ago
General auction mechanism for search advertising
In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the pag...
Dávid Pál, Gagan Aggarwal, Martin P&...
ATAL
2004
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies
Auctions and exchanges are important coordination mechanisms for multiagent systems. Most multi-good markets are combinatorial in that the agents have preferences over bundles of ...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm