Abstract. We derive a polynomial time algorithm to compute a stable solution in a mixed matching market from an auction procedure as presented by Eriksson and Karlander [5]. As a s...
We study auction mechanisms for sharing spectrum among a group of users, subject to a constraint on the interference temperature at a measurement point. The users access the channe...
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...
Full revelation of private values is impractical in many large-scale markets, where posted price mechanisms are a simpler alternative. In this work, we compare the asymptotic beha...
This paper presents an approach to develop bidding agents that participate in multiple alternative auctions, with the goal of obtaining an item at the lowest price. The approach c...