We present a decentralized, asynchronous market protocol for allocating and scheduling tasks among agents that contend for scarce resources, constrained by a hierarchical task dep...
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...
We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn ...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Da...
A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner....
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sa...