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CORR
2008
Springer
153views Education» more  CORR 2008»
14 years 11 months ago
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constr...
Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Evdokia Nikolova, M...
JCSS
2008
138views more  JCSS 2008»
14 years 11 months ago
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
CORR
2008
Springer
134views Education» more  CORR 2008»
14 years 11 months ago
Online Ad Slotting With Cancellations
Many advertisers (bidders) use Internet systems to buy advertisements on publishers' webpages or on traditional media such as radio, TV and newsprint. They seek a simple, onl...
Florin Constantin, Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, ...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
156views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
15 years 3 months ago
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good ...
Mukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan
AMMA
2009
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
Maher Said