We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
Many e-services are time-sensitive as the users request them for a specific time period. Such services need to be repeatedly offered to keep them constantly utilized. This paper s...
The group-buying auction is a new kind of dynamic pricing mechanism on the Internet. It is a variant of the sellers' price double auction, which makes the bidders as a group t...
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction,...
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...