In this paper we consider a common form of the English auction that is widely used in online Internet auctions. This discrete bid auction requires that the bidders may only submit...
Esther David, Alex Rogers, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kr...
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
We investigate the class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items in unlimited supply. We adopt the worst-case competitive framework defined by [8, 4] th...
Combinatorial auctions are difficult to analyze in part because of the vast number of potential strategies available to the bidders. Proxy bidding interfaces limit the users’ s...
Peter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Jie Zhong, Ashish Su...
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MMUCAs) offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, in order for mixed auctions ...