The linear model with sparsity-favouring prior on the coefficients has important applications in many different domains. In machine learning, most methods to date search for maxim...
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
Auction mechanism design has traditionally been a largely analytic process, relying on assumptions such as fully rational bidders. In practice, however, bidders often exhibit unkn...
David Pardoe, Peter Stone, Maytal Saar-Tsechansky,...
Our proposed methods employ learning and search techniques to estimate outcome features of interest as a function of mechanism parameter settings. We illustrate our approach with ...
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Christopher Kiekintveld, Mic...