An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational compl...
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the adversary/follower) before the advers...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
In this paper, we show how our AI opponents learn internal representations of probabilities. We use a Bayesian interpretation of such subjectivist probabilities but do not impleme...
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
We present and formally investigate Cooperative Boolean Games, a new, natural family of coalitional games that are both compact and expressive. In such a game, an agent's pri...
Paul E. Dunne, Wiebe van der Hoek, Sarit Kraus, Mi...