Sciweavers

107 search results - page 19 / 22
» Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions
Sort
View
AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
14 years 11 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
90views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
15 years 5 months ago
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange
We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive ...
David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Ad...
AAAI
2011
13 years 11 months ago
On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions
Externalities are recognized to exist in the sponsored search market, where two co-located ads compete for user attention. Existing work focuses on the effect of another ad on th...
Florin Constantin, Malvika Rao, Chien-Chung Huang,...
CP
2007
Springer
15 years 6 months ago
Reformulating CSPs for Scalability with Application to Geospatial Reasoning
While many real-world combinatorial problems can be advantageously modeled and solved using Constraint Programming, scalability remains a major issue in practice. Constraint models...
Kenneth M. Bayer, Martin Michalowski, Berthe Y. Ch...
WINE
2009
Springer
194views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
15 years 6 months ago
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi