We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
In this paper, we consider the design of an agent that is able to autonomously make optimal bundling decisions when selling multiple heterogeneous items within existing online auc...
Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jenn...
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...
Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users’ search queries via an auction. Advertisers have to solve a complex optimization problem of how to place bids o...