Despite the large amounts of runtime needed to adequately solve a combinatorial auction (CA), existing iterative CA auction protocols require winner determination during every rou...
Ryan Kastner, Christina Hsieh, Miodrag Potkonjak, ...
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
We present a cryptographic protocol for conducting efficient, provably correct and secrecy-preserving combinatorial clock-proxy auctions. The “clock phase” functions as a trust...
David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Christopher Tho...
In this paper we present an advanced bidding agent that participates in first-price sealed bid auctions to allocate advertising space on BluScreen – an experimental public adve...
Alex Rogers, Esther David, Terry R. Payne, Nichola...
Combinatorial auctions, where buyers can bid on bundles of items rather than bidding them sequentially, often lead to more economically efficient allocations of financial resource...