The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
We present empirical results of an auction-based algorithm for dynamic allocation of tasks to robots. The results have been obtained both in simulation and using real robots. A di...
This paper presents a decentralized task allocation method that can handle allocation of tasks with time and precedence constraints in a multi-agent setting where not all informat...
Mark Hoogendoorn, Maria L. Gini, Catholijn M. Jonk...
In this paper, we investigate a model of a combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction, in which each sales item is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer...