We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in a...
Abstract— We consider a joint randomized scheduling, congestion control mechanism for general wireless networks. We allow for a set of imperfections in the operation of the rando...
Atilla Eryilmaz, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Devavrat Shah...
This paper considers a general setting for structured procurement and the problem a buyer faces in designing a procurement mechanism to maximize profit. This brings together two a...
Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartlin...
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier