We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
The pervasiveness of wireless devices and the architectural organization of wireless networks in distributed communities, where no notion of trust can be assumed, are the main rea...
Svetlana Radosavac, John S. Baras, Iordanis Koutso...
We study the question whether the sequential or parallel composition of two functions, each indistinguishable from a random function by non-adaptive distinguishers is secure agains...
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are...
Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Pa...
We study a model of path-vector routing in which nodes’ routing policies are based on subjective cost assessments of alternative routes. The routes are constrained by the requir...
Joan Feigenbaum, David R. Karger, Vahab S. Mirrokn...