We study auction-like algorithms for the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating agents. To reduce the team cost of sequential single-item auction algorithms, we generalize...
Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey, Xiaoming Zheng, Ilgaz...
General combinatorial auctions—auctions in which bidders place unrestricted bids for bundles of goods—are the subject of increasing study. Much of this work has focused on alg...
Abstract. In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items....
Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand co...
We present a novel algorithm for computing the optimal winning bids in a combinatorial auction (CA), that is, an auction in which bidders bid for bundles of goods. All previously ...
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz