In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets,...
In this paper, we explore the use of the web as an environment for electronic commerce. In particular, we develop a novel mechanism that creates incentives for honesty in electron...
Often, we wish to design incentive-compatible algorithms for settings in which the players' private information is drawn from discrete domains (e.g., integer values). Our mai...
In this paper, we study a service procurement problem with uncertainty as to whether service providers are capable of completing a given task within a specified deadline. This typ...
Enrico Gerding, Sebastian Stein, Kate Larson, Alex...
Abstract. In peer-to-peer based live streaming systems, a great number of participants have to cooperate to efficiently and reliably distribute a continuous flow of data. Each rec...
Michael Brinkmeier, Mathias Fischer, Sascha Grau, ...