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» Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
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ATAL
2009
Springer
15 years 4 months ago
The price of democracy in coalition formation
Whenever rational agents form coalitions to execute tasks, doing so via a decentralized negotiation process—while more robust and democratic—may lead to a loss of efficiency ...
Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Maria Polukar...
SAGT
2010
Springer
202views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
14 years 8 months ago
Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games. These coalition formation games are specified by an undirected e...
Martin Gairing, Rahul Savani
SAGT
2010
Springer
191views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
14 years 8 months ago
Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind