Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Traditional performance analysis of approximation algorithms considers overall performance, while economic fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receiv...
Abstract. We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to captur...
Abstract. In this paper we initiate an exploration of relationships between “preference elicitation”, a learning-style problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the pr...
Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, M...
We present economically augmented job shop scheduling (EJSP) as an example of a coordination problem among selfinterested agents with private information. We discuss its signific...