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» Combinatorial auctions with externalities
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AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
14 years 10 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
ALDT
2009
Springer
172views Algorithms» more  ALDT 2009»
15 years 4 months ago
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
Traditional performance analysis of approximation algorithms considers overall performance, while economic fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receiv...
Ahuva Mu'alem
112
Voted
AMEC
2004
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations
Abstract. We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to captur...
Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
COLT
2003
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
Abstract. In this paper we initiate an exploration of relationships between “preference elicitation”, a learning-style problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the pr...
Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, M...
AIPS
2003
14 years 11 months ago
Economically Augmented Job Shop Scheduling
We present economically augmented job shop scheduling (EJSP) as an example of a coordination problem among selfinterested agents with private information. We discuss its signific...
Wolfram Conen