220 search results - page 35 / 44 » Combinatorial auctions with externalities |
102
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AIR
2004
14 years 11 months ago
2004
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
ALDT
2009
Springer
15 years 6 months ago
2009
Springer
Traditional performance analysis of approximation algorithms considers overall performance, while economic fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receiv...
126
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AMEC
2004
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to captur...
104
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COLT
2003
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
2003
Springer
Abstract. In this paper we initiate an exploration of relationships between “preference elicitation”, a learning-style problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the pr...
81
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AIPS
2003
15 years 1 months ago
2003
We present economically augmented job shop scheduling (EJSP) as an example of a coordination problem among selfinterested agents with private information. We discuss its signific...