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» Combinatorial auctions with externalities
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FOCS
2005
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
ATAL
2010
Springer
14 years 11 months ago
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
168
Voted
CAISE
2008
Springer
15 years 2 days ago
An Electronic Market-place Centralising Exchanges in the Virtual Enterprise: a Model Proposition
In this paper, we show that Service Oriented Architectures enable exchanges to be more flexible inside the virtual enterprise (VE), because they create an electronic market-place b...
Hervé Mathieu
ENTCS
2008
106views more  ENTCS 2008»
14 years 10 months ago
Reduction Semantics and Formal Analysis of Orc Programs
Orc is a language for orchestration of web services developed by J. Misra that offers simple, yet powerful and elegant, constructs to program sophisticated web orchestration appli...
Musab AlTurki, José Meseguer
ARITH
2005
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
Data Dependent Power Use in Multipliers
Recent research has demonstrated the vulnerability of certain smart card architectures to power and electromagnetic analysis when multiplier operations are insufficiently shielde...
Colin D. Walter, David Samyde