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» Competitive auctions and digital goods
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ATAL
2003
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
SODA
2008
ACM
109views Algorithms» more  SODA 2008»
14 years 11 months ago
Auctions for structured procurement
This paper considers a general setting for structured procurement and the problem a buyer faces in designing a procurement mechanism to maximize profit. This brings together two a...
Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartlin...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a wide variety of r...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
ICMAS
1998
14 years 11 months ago
Emergent Properties of a Market-based Digital Library with Strategic Agents
The University of Michigan Digital Library (UMDL) is an open system that allows third-parties to build and integrate their own profit-seeking agents into the marketplace of inform...
Sunju Park, Edmund H. Durfee, William P. Birmingha...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
156views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
15 years 2 months ago
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good ...
Mukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan