1034 search results - page 11 / 207 » Competitive generalized auctions |
WINE
2007
Springer
15 years 6 months ago
2007
Springer
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
CORR
2010
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...
ATAL
2005
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
2005
Springer
This paper presents a new negotiation mechanism and a new supplier model for Trading Agent Competition Supply Chain Management(TAC SCM). Under the new negotiation mechanism, an ag...
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SIGECOM
2008
ACM
14 years 12 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
IJCAI
2007
15 years 1 months ago
2007
We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions through a mediating auction institution, where each seller must set its individual auc...