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» Competitive generalized auctions
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95
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SIGECOM
2006
ACM
138views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
15 years 6 months ago
Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions
We investigate the space of two-sided multiattribute auctions, focusing on the relationship between constraints on the offers traders can express through bids, and the resulting c...
Yagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman, Kevin M. Lochner
108
Voted
ATAL
2010
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Honor among thieves: collusion in multi-unit auctions
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...
Yoram Bachrach
110
Voted
WINE
2010
Springer
152views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
14 years 10 months ago
Collusion in VCG Path Procurement Auctions
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
Yoram Bachrach, Peter Key, Morteza Zadimoghaddam
111
Voted
AMMA
2009
Springer
15 years 7 months ago
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
Maher Said
78
Voted
AAAI
2010
15 years 1 months ago
Asymmetric Spite in Auctions
In many auctions, agents bid more aggressively than selfinterest would prescribe. This can be explained by spite, where the agent's utility not only increases in the agent�...
Ankit Sharma, Tuomas Sandholm