1034 search results - page 64 / 207 » Competitive generalized auctions |
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 4 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
85
Voted
ESA
2003
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
2003
Springer
In [2] it was shown that the obvious semi-clairvoyant generalization of the Shortest Processing Time is O(1)-competitive with respect to average stretch on a single machine. In [2...
124
Voted
SODA
2008
ACM
15 years 1 months ago
2008
ACM
This paper considers a general setting for structured procurement and the problem a buyer faces in designing a procurement mechanism to maximize profit. This brings together two a...
93
Voted
AAAI
2004
15 years 1 months ago
2004
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are important mechanisms for allocating interrelated items. Unfortunately, winner determination is NP-complete unless there is special structure. We s...
109
Voted
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
15 years 12 days ago
2008
ACM
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...