144 search results - page 11 / 29 » Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games |
101
Voted
SAGT
2009
Springer
15 years 8 months ago
2009
Springer
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the context of flows over time. Many results on static routing games have been obtained over the last ten years. In flows ov...
117
Voted
FOCS
2006
IEEE
15 years 8 months ago
2006
IEEE
We advance significantly beyond the recent progress on the algorithmic complexity of Nash equilibria by solving two major open problems in the approximation of Nash equilibria an...
111
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ICALP
2007
Springer
15 years 8 months ago
2007
Springer
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
144
Voted
ATAL
2010
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...