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» Course Allocation by Proxy Auction
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WINE
2010
Springer
145views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
14 years 7 months ago
Course Allocation by Proxy Auction
We propose a new proxy bidding mechanism to allocate courses to students given students' reported preferences. Our mechanism is motivated by a specific strategic downgrading m...
Scott Duke Kominers, Mike Ruberry, Jonathan Ullman
WECWIS
2005
IEEE
153views ECommerce» more  WECWIS 2005»
15 years 3 months ago
A Framework for Computing the Outcome of Proxied Combinatorial Auctions
Proxy bidding has been proposed for combinatorial auctions as a means to speed up the auctions, to simplify the user interface, and to limit strategic behavior. The only previousl...
Jie Zhong, Peter R. Wurman
79
Voted
AAAI
2000
14 years 10 months ago
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
AMAI
2005
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes
ATAL
2010
Springer
14 years 10 months ago
Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation
In the course allocation problem, a university administrator seeks to efficiently and fairly allocate schedules of over-demanded courses to students with heterogeneous preferences...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish