We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This model is cryptographically sound in ...
Christoph Sprenger, Michael Backes, David A. Basin...
Abstract. We prove a computational soundness theorem for the symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols which extends an analogous theorem of Abadi and Rogaway (J. of Cryptology ...
We prove the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol secure under real, active cryptographic attacks including concurrent protocol runs. This proof is based on an abstract crypt...
We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees protocol. More precisely, we show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active att...
ABSTRACT. In many automated methods for proving inductive theorems, finding a suitable generalization of a conjecture is a key for the success of proof attempts. On the other hand...