In this paper, we focus on mechanism design for single leader Stackelberg problems, which are a special case of hierarchical decision making problems in which a distinguished agent...
Bidders on eBay have no dominant bidding strategy when faced with multiple auctions each offering an item of interest. As seen through an analysis of 1,956 auctions on eBay for a...
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
Auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce and a promising field for applying multi-agent technologies. Correctly judging the quality of auctioned items is ofte...
This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Com...