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» Designing the perfect auction
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WINE
2007
Springer
120views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
15 years 3 months ago
False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purch...
Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahy...
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
144views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
15 years 2 months ago
Security model for a multi-agent marketplace
A multi-agent marketplace, MAGNET (Multi AGent Negotiation Testbed), is a promising solution to conduct online combinatorial auctions. The trust model of MAGNET is somewhat diffe...
Ashutosh Jaiswal, Yongdae Kim, Maria L. Gini
94
Voted
MOBIHOC
2010
ACM
14 years 7 months ago
Breaking bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions
Dynamic spectrum auction is an effective solution to provide spectrum on-demand to many small wireless networks. As the number of participants grows, bidder collusion becomes a se...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
SODA
2012
ACM
200views Algorithms» more  SODA 2012»
12 years 12 months ago
Optimal crowdsourcing contests
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to e...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian ...
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
Abstract. We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-...
Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin