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CHI
2001
ACM
15 years 9 months ago
Ignoring perfect knowledge in-the-world for imperfect knowledge in-the-head
Constraints and dependencies among the elements of embodied cognition form patterns or microstrategies of interactive behavior. Hard constraints determine which microstrategies ar...
Wayne D. Gray, Wai-Tat Fu
COGSCI
2004
81views more  COGSCI 2004»
14 years 9 months ago
Soft constraints in interactive behavior: the case of ignoring perfect knowledge in-the-world for imperfect knowledge in-the-hea
Constraints and dependencies among the elements of embodied cognition form patterns or microstrategies of interactive behavior. Hard constraints determine which microstrategies ar...
Wayne D. Gray, Wai-Tat Fu
CORR
2008
Springer
83views Education» more  CORR 2008»
14 years 9 months ago
Code diversity in multiple antenna wireless communication
The standard approach to the design of individual space
Yiyue Wu, A. Robert Calderbank
FOCS
2005
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ï¬...
Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Tami Tamir
CORR
2010
Springer
128views Education» more  CORR 2010»
14 years 6 months ago
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there...
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg