In this paper we present an advanced bidding agent that participates in first-price sealed bid auctions to allocate advertising space on BluScreen – an experimental public adve...
Alex Rogers, Esther David, Terry R. Payne, Nichola...
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information fr...
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
We examine the design space of auction mechanisms and identify three core activities that structure this space. Formal parameters qualifying the performance core activities enable...
Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman, William E. Wa...
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...