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» Designing the perfect auction
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ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 12 days ago
An advanced bidding agent for advertisement selection on public displays
In this paper we present an advanced bidding agent that participates in first-price sealed bid auctions to allocate advertising space on BluScreen – an experimental public adve...
Alex Rogers, Esther David, Terry R. Payne, Nichola...
AAAI
2010
13 years 7 months ago
Stability and Incentive Compatibility in a Kernel-Based Combinatorial Auction
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information fr...
Sébastien Lahaie
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
220views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 6 months ago
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
AIM
2002
13 years 6 months ago
Specifying Rules for Electronic Auctions
We examine the design space of auction mechanisms and identify three core activities that structure this space. Formal parameters qualifying the performance core activities enable...
Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman, William E. Wa...
CORR
2010
Springer
136views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 3 months ago
On Optimal Single-Item Auctions
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...
Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos