628 search results - page 3 / 126 » Designing the perfect auction |
ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 12 days ago
2007
Springer
In this paper we present an advanced bidding agent that participates in first-price sealed bid auctions to allocate advertising space on BluScreen – an experimental public adve...
AAAI
2010
13 years 7 months ago
2010
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information fr...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 6 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
AIM
2002
13 years 6 months ago
2002
We examine the design space of auction mechanisms and identify three core activities that structure this space. Formal parameters qualifying the performance core activities enable...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...