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SIGECOM
2009
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
16 years 10 days ago
Approximate mechanism design without money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
114views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
16 years 10 days ago
Policy teaching through reward function learning
Policy teaching considers a Markov Decision Process setting in which an interested party aims to influence an agent’s decisions by providing limited incentives. In this paper, ...
Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
139views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
16 years 10 days ago
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
95views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
16 years 10 days ago
Eliciting truthful answers to multiple-choice questions
Motivated by the prevalence of online questionnaires in electronic commerce, and of multiple-choice questions in such questionnaires, we consider the problem of eliciting truthful...
Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
16 years 10 days ago
Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results
We consider models for bargaining in social networks, in which players are represented by vertices and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between pairs of players. ...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna