We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs), which extends the class of congestion games to allow for facility failures. In a basic CGF (BCGF) agents ...
Secure email has struggled with signifcant obstacles to adoption, among them the low usability of encryption software and the cost and overhead of obtaining public key certificat...
The explosive growth of the world-wide-web and the emergence of e-commerce has led to the development of recommender systems—a personalized information filtering technology use...