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WINE
2010
Springer
149views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
14 years 7 months ago
Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games
We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents' locat...
Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos
WINE
2010
Springer
154views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
14 years 7 months ago
The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games
Abstract. We study safety level coalitions in competitive games. Given a normal form game, we define a corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility, where the value of ...
Yoram Bachrach, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jenni...
WINE
2010
Springer
153views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
14 years 7 months ago
Approximation Schemes for Sequential Posted Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing sequential postedpricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has K copi...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Y...
WINE
2010
Springer
148views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
14 years 7 months ago
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks
In mechanism design, the goal is to create rules for making a decision based on the preferences of multiple parties (agents), while taking into account that agents may behave stra...
Vincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchfo...
WINE
2010
Springer
152views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
14 years 7 months ago
Collusion in VCG Path Procurement Auctions
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
Yoram Bachrach, Peter Key, Morteza Zadimoghaddam