Correlated equilibria are a generalization of Nash equilibria that permit agents to act in a correlated manner and can therefore, model learning in games. In this paper we define...
The class of weakly acyclic games, which includes potential games and dominance-solvable games, captures many practical application domains. Informally, a weakly acyclic game is on...
Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira
We present a new class of games, local-effect games (LEGs), which exploit structure in a different way from other compact game representations studied in AI. We show both theoreti...
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players that are relevant for a wide range of social, economic, and engineering applications. The standard solution conce...
Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Y. Weintrau...
We present Variable Influence Structure Analysis, or VISA, an algorithm that performs hierarchical decomposition of factored Markov decision processes. VISA uses a dynamic Bayesia...