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» Fairness in Combinatorial Auctioning Systems
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AAAI
2000
14 years 11 months ago
Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations
Combinatorial auctions can be used to reach efficient resource and task allocations in multiagent systems where the items are complementary. Determining the winners is NP-complete...
Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri
HICSS
2007
IEEE
141views Biometrics» more  HICSS 2007»
15 years 4 months ago
Second-Best Combinatorial Auctions - The Case of the Pricing-Per-Column Mechanism
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
Dirk Neumann, Björn Schnizler, Ilka Weber, Ch...
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki
IAT
2006
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
An Approximate Algorithm for Resource Allocation Using Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial Auctions (CAs), where users bid on combination of items, have emerged as a useful tool for resource allocation in distributed systems. However, two main difficulties...
Viswanath Avasarala, Himanshu Polavarapu, Tracy Mu...
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm