Abstract The computational proof model of Bellare and Rogaway for cryptographic protocol analysis is complemented by providing a formal specification of the actions of the adversa...
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, Yvonne Hitchco...
We present a formal model for modeling and reasoning about security protocols. Our model extends standard, inductive, trace-based, symbolic approaches with a formalization of phys...
Patrick Schaller, Benedikt Schmidt, David A. Basin...
Network designers perform challenging tasks with so many configuration options that it is often hard or even impossible for a human to predict all potentially dangerous situation...
Validation of non-functional and functional properties of these protocols during the early stages of design and development is important to reduce cost resulting from protocol ano...
In this paper we describe an application of the theory of graph transformations to the practise of language design. In particular, we have defined the static and dynamic semantics ...