We develop an algorithm for opponent modeling in large extensive-form games of imperfect information. It works by observing the opponent’s action frequencies and building an opp...
We describe a reputation-driven market that motivates human computation sellers (workers) to produce optimal levels of quality when quality is not immediately measurable and contr...
— This paper is concerned with the problem of identifying robust equilibrium postures of a planar mechanism supported by fixed frictional contacts in a twodimensional gravitation...
This paper studies a virus inoculation game on social networks. A framework is presented which allows the measuring of the windfall of friendship, i.e., how much players benefit i...
Dominic Meier, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, ...
Efficient Learning Equilibrium (ELE) is a natural solution concept for multi-agent encounters with incomplete information. It requires the learning algorithms themselves to be in ...