: We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic resu...
In contrast to classical game theoretic analysis of simultaneous and sequential play in bimatrix games, Steven Brams has proposed an alternative framework called the Theory of Mov...
Braess’s Paradox is the counterintuitive but well-known fact that removing edges from a network with “selfish routing” can decrease the latency incurred by traffic in an eq...
Agents engaged in noncooperative interaction may seek to achieve a Nash equilibrium; this requires that agents be aware of others’ rewards. Misinformation about rewards leads to...
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the co...
Noah D. Stein, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parril...