This paper introduces a novel feedback arrangement, termed re-feedback. It ensures metrics in data headers such as time to live and congestion notification will arrive at each re...
Bob Briscoe, Arnaud Jacquet, Carla Di Cairano-Gilf...
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation, task assignment and last but not leas...
Classic direct mechanisms require full type (or utility) revelation from participating agents, something that can be very difficult in practical multi-attribute settings. In this...
The emergence of Grim Trigger as the dominant strategy in the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma (IPD) on a square lattice is investigated for players with finite memory, using three differ...