It is self-evident that in numerous Multiagent settings, selfish agents stand to benefit from cooperating by forming coalitions. Nevertheless, negotiating a stable distribution of...
We advance significantly beyond the recent progress on the algorithmic complexity of Nash equilibria by solving two major open problems in the approximation of Nash equilibria an...
In traditional game theory, players are typically endowed with exogenously given knowledge of the structure of the game—either full omniscient knowledge or partial but fixed in...
Matt Lepinski, David Liben-Nowell, Seth Gilbert, A...
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...
We consider Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs), a simple model of cooperation among agents. This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that a...