We formally specify a payment protocol described in [Vogt et al., 2001]. This protocol is intended for fair exchange of time-sensitive data. Here the µCRL language is used to form...
Abstract The computational proof model of Bellare and Rogaway for cryptographic protocol analysis is complemented by providing a formal specification of the actions of the adversa...
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, Yvonne Hitchco...
Cryptographic protocols often make use of nested cryptographic primitives, for example signed message digests, or encrypted signed messages. Gordon and Jeffrey’s prior work on ty...
This paper focuses on the usability of the PINPAS tool. The PINPAS tool is an instruction-level interpreter for smartcard assembler languages, augmented with facilities to study si...
Interactive access control allows a server to compute and communicate on the fly the missing credentials to a client and to adapt its responses on the basis of presented and decli...