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AAAI
2004
13 years 7 months ago
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions
Recent algorithms provide powerful solutions to the problem of determining cost-minimizing (or revenue-maximizing) allocations of items in combinatorial auctions. However, in many...
Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields
IJCAI
2001
13 years 7 months ago
Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand co...
Craig Boutilier, Holger H. Hoos
AAAI
2000
13 years 7 months ago
Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have emerged as an important model in economics and show promise as a useful tool for tackling resource allocation in AI. Unfortunately, winner determ...
Holger H. Hoos, Craig Boutilier
IJCAI
2001
13 years 7 months ago
Bundle Design in Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids
This paper presents a method for designing bundles in a combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of El...
Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 11 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm