We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-inte...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, David Malec and Bal...
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
— Performance of a human size humanoid robot is strictly limited by performance of the motor. The progress of a motor has not been remarkable compared with the progress of electr...
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these ent...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter McBurn...
Higher level of resource integration and the addition of new features in modern multi-processors put a significant pressure on their verification. Although a large amount of res...