In large extensive form games with imperfect information, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is a popular, iterative algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria. Whi...
Richard G. Gibson, Marc Lanctot, Neil Burch, Duane...
We study a general sub-class of concave games, which we call socially concave games. We show that if each player follows any no-external regret minimization procedure then the dyn...
Games are used to evaluate and advance Multiagent and Artificial Intelligence techniques. Most of these games are deterministic with perfect information (e.g. Chess and Checkers)....
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is n...
We consider repeated games in which the player, instead of observing the action chosen by the opponent in each game round, receives a feedback generated by the combined choice of ...