We design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuation...
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan
In this paper, we examine the behavior of bidding agents that are in direct competition with the other participants in an auction setting. Thus the agents are not simply trying to...
We consider a revenue maximization problem where we are selling a set of comparable items, each available in a certain quantity (possibly unlimited) to a set of bidders. Each bidde...
Alexander Grigoriev, Joyce van Loon, Maxim Sviride...
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to ...
This paper presents a new multi-unit auction protocol (IR protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce a...