65 search results - page 8 / 13 » Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Aucti... |
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
101
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DISOPT
2008
14 years 9 months ago
2008
We study a pricing problem where buyers with non-uniform demand purchase one of many items. Each buyer has a known benefit for each item and purchases the item that gives the larg...
AAAI
2000
14 years 11 months ago
2000
Combinatorial auctions can be used to reach efficient resource and task allocations in multiagent systems where the items are complementary. Determining the winners is NP-complete...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
14 years 9 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
80
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AAAI
2012
13 years 4 hour ago
2012
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...