Sciweavers

370 search results - page 70 / 74
» Life-worlds and social relations in computers
Sort
View
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
CORR
2006
Springer
160views Education» more  CORR 2006»
14 years 9 months ago
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
JACM
2007
160views more  JACM 2007»
14 years 9 months ago
Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games
abstraction of imperfect information games ANDREW GILPIN and TUOMAS SANDHOLM Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA, USA Finding an equilibrium of an...
Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm
WWW
2009
ACM
15 years 10 months ago
Bid optimization for broad match ad auctions
Ad auctions in sponsored search support"broad match"that allows an advertiser to target a large number of queries while bidding only on a limited number. While giving mo...
Eyal Even-Dar, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan...
80
Voted
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
135views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
15 years 3 months ago
Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information
Finding an equilibrium of an extensive form game of imperfect information is a fundamental problem in computational game theory, but current techniques do not scale to large games...
Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm