We consider markets in the classical Arrow-Debreu model. There are n agents and m goods. Each buyer has a concave utility function (of the bundle of goods he/she buys) and an init...
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Meh...
In this article, we study the problem of online market clearing where there is one commodity in the market being bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers whose bids arrive an...
— Lifetime maximization is one key element in the design of sensor-network-based surveillance applications. We propose a protocol for node sleep scheduling that guarantees a boun...
Qing Cao, Tarek F. Abdelzaher, Tian He, John A. St...
We investigate the dynamics of trader behaviors using a co-evolutionary genetic programming system to simulate a double-auction market. The objective of this study is twofold. Fir...