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» Maximal Introspection of Agents
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AAAI
2012
13 years 1 months ago
Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm
116
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ICML
1995
IEEE
15 years 11 months ago
Learning Policies for Partially Observable Environments: Scaling Up
Partially observable Markov decision processes (pomdp's) model decision problems in which an agent tries to maximize its reward in the face of limited and/or noisy sensor fee...
Michael L. Littman, Anthony R. Cassandra, Leslie P...
AMMA
2009
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
Fair Package Assignment
We consider the problem of fair allocation in the package assignment model, where a set of indivisible items, held by single seller, must be efficiently allocated to agents with q...
Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
ATAL
2009
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
Team competition
In a team competition, two participating teams have an equal number of players, and each team orders its players linearly based on their strengths. A mechanism then specifies how...
Pingzhong Tang, Yoav Shoham, Fangzhen Lin
ATAL
2009
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
On the complexity of schedule control problems for knockout tournaments
Knockout tournaments constitute a common format of sporting events, and also model a specific type of election scheme (namely, sequential pairwise elimination election). In such ...
Thuc Vu, Alon Altman, Yoav Shoham