We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common econom...
We develop an efficient learning framework to construct signal dictionaries for sparse representation by selecting the dictionary columns from multiple candidate bases. By sparse,...
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of selfinterested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public plann...
We propose a new objective function for superpixel segmentation. This objective function consists of two components: entropy rate of a random walk on a graph and a balancing term....